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Customer needs must be translated through identifiable activities into a
useful and practical product, to attain high quality and reliability. The collection of
activities employed goes by several names, to include the discipline of Systems
Engineering, or more commonly the Quality Function in a Quality Engineering
environment (Gryna, Chua, & DeFeo, 2007). Customer utilization of a system or
product must also be sustained throughout the life-cycle. Failure management
strategies must be developed to ensure systems are available and safe for customer
use. These activities are crucial to ensure reliable, cost-effective and sustainable
products both in the commercial and government sector.
The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) has recognized alarming trends in
the acquisition of new products or systems. First, the percentage of new acquisitions
failing to meet reliability requirements is increasing. Second, the percentage of
fielded systems that have decreasing durability and reliability performance is also
increasing (McLeish, 2010). These trends were expressed in a memorandum to the
DoD community from the Director of Systems Engineering in the Office of the
Secretary of Defense in 2010. The memo stated that over a 25-year period a
staggering 25 percent of defense systems were not found suitable for operational
testing. The memo further stated that “there is no question the systems emerging
from our design and development efforts are often not reliable” (Gilmore, 2010).
More recently, a panel as part of the Committee on National Statistics released a
report echoing that problems within DoD acquisition remain since the 2010
Gilmore memo (Panel on Reliability Growth Methods for Defense Systems, 2015).
The report states that progress has been made in solving DoD reliability and
suitability issues, however, sustained focus on earlier recommendations must
continue to reverse the trend.
Resultant poor performance has been illustrated with several examples,
including the Early-Infantry Brigade Combat Team (E-IBCT) unmanned aerial
system which only achieved 1/10th of its mean time between system aborts
requirement (Gilmore, 2010), and more recently the F-35 aircraft (Gilmore,
Michael, 2015). As a result, the DoD has instituted several initiatives aimed at
reversing the trend. These initiatives include strengthening of oversight and
accountability through the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2008,
reduction of risk through revitalized Systems and Reliability Engineering
processes, standardization of reliability best practices in new programs through a
reliability scorecard, and a shift to Physics of Failure (PoF) based reliability
prediction (McLeish, 2010).
Additionally, a report from the Defense Science Board (DSB) Task Force
on Developmental Test and Evaluation concluded that: “The single most important
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step necessary to correct high suitability failure rates is to ensure programs are
formulated to execute a viable systems engineering strategy from the beginning,
including a robust RAM program, as an integral part of design and development.
No amount of testing will compensate for deficiencies in RAM program
foundation” (McLeish, 2010).
As stated in the DSB Task Force report (McLeish, 2010), development of a
robust RAM program must be accomplished early in design resulting in reduced
life-cycle cost while achieving performance objectives. For a product or system to
achieve RAM goals the following activities must be performed adapted from
(Pulido, 2013) as part of a RAM program:
• Identification of reliability, availability and maintainability goals or
requirements,
• Iteratively forecast, measure and verify that these requirements are met,
and
• Ensuring quality problems are not induced by manufacturing and
assembly procedures.
One significant aspect of a RAM program measures progress towards
requirements, which is intrinsically coupled with risk assessment. The risk
assessment must identify both technical and programmatic risks to successfully
meeting or exceeding these requirements. These must then be further decomposed
into high, medium and low risks – and addressed early in design. Identification of
these technical risks is not a trivial task and requires both pro-active thinking and
rigorous analysis tools or processes. Risk assessment continues after fielding of
systems. Field data within structured processes such as Reliability Centered
Maintenance (RCM) is typically utilized to assess and refine failure management
strategies to include preventative maintenance. Critical to the assessment process
is identification and rating of failure modes anticipated during the design or
emerging during sustainment.
This paper investigates the role of human subjectivity in rating of failure
modes, specifically within the FMECA process, which is one of the most widely
utilized risk management and design improvement tool. We explicitly consider
severity selection as part of a more extensive Reliability Centered Maintenance
(RCM) analysis, which is widely utilized within the DoD community. Severity
selection is investigated by varying the amount of input information specific to a
failure mode while assessing severity levels as selected by participants. The
quantity and relevance of the input information were varied to replicate typical
scenarios encountered during FMECA analysis. Additionally, the amount and
relevance of the input information may be a contributing factor in inadequate risk
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analysis. For example, in new acquisition very little (or no information) is available
to analysts, while large amounts of work order (field data) information are available
once the system enters sustainment. However, within sustainment environments,
there may raise significant quality concerns with the data as discussed by Banghart,
Solomon, and Comstock (Banghart, Comstock, & Solomon, 2017).
The paper is organized as follows. The first section provides pertinent
background information regarding risk assessment in a reliability engineering
context. This is followed by a literature review of identified problems and proposed
solutions within the FMECA process to provide the necessary context to the reader.
Next, the method of this study is presented followed by results and discussion.
Finally, we present areas for future work.
FMEA and FMECA as a Risk Management Tool
Application of risk assessment during the product concept phase, when little
or no data is available, is problematic. At this stage in the design, testing has not
been performed nor does a physical design exist; however, this is a crucial time to
incorporate RAM. In this phase, FMEA or FMECA are frequently utilized, mainly
since data is not available to develop failure modes based on the proposed design.
The resulting analysis can then be utilized to evaluate weak areas of the design and
compare other design alternatives. FMECA is typically considered as an extension
to FMEA, with the addition of Criticality Analysis. The reader is referred to Carlson
for a complete description of each analysis (Carlson, 2012). Regardless of the
analysis process, the variables within FMEA/FMECA are largely quantified by
individuals and teams in a qualitative manner.
Risk management consists of several elements, to include assessment,
management and risk communication (Pulido, 2013). FMEA/FMECA cradle all
parts of this risk management framework. For example, failure modes are
identified, along with probability and severity classifications, all of which forms
part of risk assessment. However, mitigation strategies for failure modes form part
of risk management, while the process itself facilitates risk communication. At the
heart of FMEA/FMEC, A are failure modes that are scored. For example, an
analysis team may identify 25 different failure modes for a hydraulic system.
Failure modes may include items such as internal pump failure, pump cavitation or
worn/torn seals. Each failure mode includes a description of the effects. For
example, the effects may include reduced pressure or fluid leaks. Failure modes are
also traceable to systems and overall functions (such as maintaining system
pressure). Each failure mode is scored, with several scales available.
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FMEA/FMECA is widely considered as a proactive method to establish a
risk management policy (Tay & Lim, 2006; Segismundo & Miguel, 2008; Claxton
& Campbell-Allen, 2017). FMEA/FMECA is one of the most widely utilized tools
since it is a well-defined process and can be tailored to domain-specific processes
or systems. Furthermore, expert opinion can be incorporated, and the analysis can
be performed with little or no data.
FMEA has shown success across many industries (Arabian-Hoseynabadi,
Oraee, & Tavner, 2010; Welborn, 2010; Chang, Liu, & Wei, 2001; Chang, Wei, &
Lee, 1999; Chen, 2007). One benefit of FMEA/FMECA as an analysis tool is that
it is structured and usually includes a diverse group of people from different
background and experiences. This potentially allows different viewpoints to be
incorporated leading to a more robust analysis. The analysis is accomplished by
analyzing failure modes, or technical risks that are reasonably likely to occur, along
with their associated consequences (or severity). In methodologies such as
Reliability Centered Maintenance (RCM), it is further extended to develop
mitigation strategies (Bozdag, Asan, Soyer, & Serdarasan, 2015).
FMEA/FMECA also has problems. These problems have received
extensive attention in the literature, with several changes proposed to address
possible identified shortfalls within the methodology. The research community has
firmly established that humans make subjective decisions (Fox & Rottenstreich,
2003). However, this subjectivity has not been extensively studied within RCM.
Thus, the reliability or the “extent to which … any measuring procedure yields the
same results on repeated trials” (Carmines & Zeller, 1979) is mostly unknown for
RCM. This subjectivity is driven by internal biases and has been shown to occur
during probability estimation in tools such as fault trees (Fox & Rottenstreich,
2003). Additionally, the subjectivity occurs in most (if not all people) to include
experts and novice users (Fox & Rottenstreich, 2003).
FMEA/FMECA requires several variables to be quantified by either
individuals, teams or experts and be a complex task. The task complexity is rooted
in many related variables (for example, failure mode one influencing the probability
of failure mode two), undefined variables (data not available) and that several
possible solutions exist (Pohl, 2006). Human bias within tasks has been recognized
and a plethora of techniques adapted from evidence theory, grey theory and fuzzy
logic have emerged (Song, Ming, Wu, & Zhu, 2014; Yang, Huang, He, Zhu, &
Wen, 2010; Chang, Liu, & Wei, 2001; Chang & Cheng, 2010; Chang, Wei, & Lee,
1999). Recent research has also indicated that our biases and behavior is closely
tied to our genetic make-up and the underlying cognitive processes (Forgas,
Haselton, & Hippel, 2007). Decision making in a clinical setting was explored by
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Smith et al. (Smith, Higgs, & Ellis, 2008). In their research, they highlighted that
understanding of the problem at hand, and contextual factors are both important in
determining outcomes. Thus, they recommend that both the individual’s attributes,
as well as context, must be considered.
However, as noted by Bozdag et al. (2015) very little research has been
focused on understanding uncertainty and variations ratings amongst experts
(Bozdag, Asan, Soyer, & Serdarasan, 2015). Bozdag et al. (2015) further develop
a failure mode assessment and prioritization model based on fuzzy logic that both
incorporates individual and consensus judgment into a risk rating (Bozdag, Asan,
Soyer, & Serdarasan, 2015). As innovative as this model is, there is almost no
literature available that illustrates wherein FMEA/FMECA human variability is
most prevalent. The healthcare community has performed a few small studies to
probe this question, which are detailed in the next section (Franklin, & Barber,
2012, Shebl, Franklin, & Barber, 2009; Shebl). Understanding where variation is
most prevalent will aid in developing models that can be validated and ultimately
improve the process.
Literature Review
The efforts to strengthen RAM activities early in design emphasize various
Design for Reliability (DfR) tools such as FMEA/FMECA. DfR embraces the
customer needs and is a process through which customer satisfaction is maximized.
The process utilizes numerous integrated tools to support a product (and design)
from the cradle to the grave while ensuring the highest reliability at the lowest lifecycle cost. FMEA is used extensively throughout the industry to improve system
reliability and aid in risk assessment and is a well-recognized DfR tool. It was
utilized as early as the 1960s by the U.S. National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA) on programs such as the Apollo, Viking, Voyager and
Skylab explorations. The process was also adopted early on by the Society for
Automotive Engineers (SAE) in 1967. The use of FMEA spread rapidly to other
industries during the 1970s and subsequent years and is now utilized in a variety of
industries including military, semiconductors, and the foodservice industry. More
recently FMEA has been adopted within the healthcare industry to assess the highrisk process of care (Franklin, Shebl, & Barber, 2012). FMEA is useful in
understanding the failure modes of systems or products, qualifying the effects of
failure, and aiding in the development of mitigation strategies. It is a useful tool in
improving quality, reliability, and the maintainability of designs, and is a critical
analysis component in risk management. FMEA can be applied to almost any
system or process and thus universally valuable.

Published by Scholarly Commons, 2018

5

International Journal of Aviation, Aeronautics, and Aerospace, Vol. 5 [2018], Iss. 1, Art. 2

The literature is structured as follows. First, we discuss relevant research
regarding the validity of FMEA as a risk assessment process (to include
comparisons to other tools), followed by a review of scales both in industry and
academia. Next, various issues with the Risk Priority Number is discussed,
followed by an overview of how FMEA/FMECA is utilized within Reliability
Centered Maintenance and military applications.
FMEA Outputs, Rating Scales, and Validity
There are two critical outputs from an FMEA. The first is the associated risk
ranking, which aids in the identification of high priority failure modes. The second
is the associated mitigation strategy. Methodologies such as RCM have utilized
FMEAs along with criticality assessment to develop cost-effective maintenance
programs. RCM compares the associated risk and cost of failure with the cost of
preventive maintenance or redesign. This comparison is then utilized to determine
cost-effective mitigation strategies. In cases where safety is a concern, failure
modes should always include some form of mitigation.
While some of the available literature does evaluate the FMEA process and
explore possible sources of error, research-based validation of FMEA value and
effectiveness severely lacks, as are specific recommendations for improvement of
the process, regarding the human factor. Some work has been done within the
healthcare community, which previously relied largely upon retroactive risk
management, with the goal of quantifying the reliability and validity of FMEA as
a technique of risk analysis. Specifically, results from recent studies demonstrated
little reliability and validity within the healthcare setting of FMEA. The researchers
did not disregard the potential value or conclude that the FMEA process offered no
benefit whatsoever, but did apparently reveal flaws which necessitate process
refinement (Shebl, Franklin, & Barber, 2009; Phipps, Meakin, Beatty, Nsoedo, &
Parker, 2008; Konstandinidou, Nivolianitou, Kiranoudis, & Markatos, 2006;
Apkon, Probst, Leonard, DeLizio, & Vitale, 2004; Lyons, Adams,
Woloshynowych, & Vincent, 2004). These studies highlighted the discrepancies
between the severity ratings selected by different groups as well as the lack of
correlation of risks identified. Shebl et al. found that the two different participant
groups not only identified different risks, but also rated overlapping risks
differently (Shebl, Franklin, & Barber, 2009). Differences were also found between
conditions which used consensuses to determine an overall severity rating and those
that merely averaged individual ratings (Ashley & Armitage, 2010).
Potts et al. (2014) investigated the validity of structured risk analysis
methods. They were specifically interested in comparing the resultant outcomes of
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two conditions: analysis using different techniques, and if different groups can
replicate risk analysis results using the same technique. They investigated the
Structured What If Technique (SWIFT) and HFMEA (FMEA tailored to the
healthcare industry) in a workshop setting (Potts et al., 2014). Teams of five
participants per group worked together to make decisions using each of the two
techniques. Additionally, all the participants were new to risk and task analysis with
no experience in either technique. The participants were also provided with a
hierarchical task analysis diagram previously developed. First, the risks identified
in each technique were compared for overlap (both regarding the actual risk and the
associated severity rating) as well as overlap with current risk management
processes. The participants identified 61 total risks, with three deemed critical
when utilizing the SWIFT approach. The HFMEA resulted in a total of 72 risks,
with 12 deemed high risk. The researchers compared the identified risks and
concluded that 33 (54.1 percent) risks identified by SWIFT were not identified by
HFMEA. In turn, HFMEA had 42 (58.3 percent) risks that were not identified by
SWIFT. Additionally, the researchers concluded that there was little overlap of high
risks items between the two analyses techniques (Potts et al., 2014).
Various scales have been proposed for both the occurrence, detection, and
severity measures. Scales of 1 to 10 are prevalent in the literature. However, fivepoint scales have also been presented. RCM processes frequently utilize four-point
scales within the military community (NAVAIR, 2005; Department of Defense,
2012). The reader is referred to Aguilar and Salomon for a comparison of different
scales (Aguiar, de Souza, & Salomon, 2010).
Risk Priority Number (RPN) Calculation
The Risk Priority Number (RPN) that is utilized within FMEA is a method
aimed at ranking and prioritizing failure modes – to develop mitigation strategies
and reduce the overall consequences of the failure mode occurring. The higher the
RPN, the higher the possible risk. The goal of the analysis is threefold. First, it
provides a way to measure which failure modes pose a significant risk and should
be removed or mitigated from the system. Second, it provides insight into which
failure modes can be corrected or mitigated. Finally, it provides a basis to determine
which failure modes can be ignored (and allowed to occur) with no adverse safety
or cost implications (Bowles, 2003).
Depending on the approach followed, there are slight deviations in how the
RPN is calculated. If the RCM methodology is followed, criticality is calculated by
only including the severity rating and probability of occurrence. Detectability
calculations, though not utilized in the RCM methodology, are included in other
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methods. Bowles (Bowles, 2003) points out in his mathematical analysis of the
RPN that there are significant flaws in that approach. In the case where the RPN is
calculated by multiplying Severity (S) with a probability of occurrence (O) and
detectability (D), and assuming a range of 1 to 10 for each factor a resulting RPN
range from 1 to 1000 is obtained. As explained by Bowles, three factors within the
RPN are ordinal scales where items are ranked in series; however, the interval size
between measurements are not specified (Bowles, 2003). Siegel (1956) further
states that the intervals are determined subjectively and not identical to each other
(Siegel, 1956). Thus, conducting multiplication utilizing these factors violates basic
mathematical principles (Bowles, 2003; Siegel, 1956). Bowles further highlights
four additional concerns with utilizing the RPN in its current form. These include:
• Holes in the scale. The RPN scale is not continuous, and various numbers
between 1 and 1000 cannot be formed by the product of S, O, and D. This is
explicitly evident in higher numbers (600+). Only 120 unique numbers can
be formed with 88 percent of the range empty.
• Duplication of RPNs. RPNs can be formed with many combinations of S, O,
and D thus making the inaccurate assumption that each factor is equally
important.
• Sensitivity to small changes. The RPN can be affected significantly by a
small change in one factor, especially if the other factors are large numbers.
• Utilizing a single dimension RP to quantify and rank a design encourages
management to set arbitrary thresholds- which may not be realistic.
Several researchers have proposed alternatives to the Risk Priority Number,
and more specifically the severity measure. These measures focus on the
incorporation of cost as the primary measure of severity. Carmignani (Carmignani,
2009) replaces severity with an impact factor focused on economic loss.
Occurrence and detection are also replaced with a frequency and control factor
respectively. Carmignani proposes that the method would be used for non-safety
related failure modes. Severity derived from internal failure cost (thus cost not
observed by a customer) is also considered by von Ahsen (von Ahsen, 2008). Dong
utilizes fuzzy logic and utility theory to derive a cost-based severity (Dong, 2007).
Rhee and Ishii extend cost-based measures to include delay times, such as logistics
and administrative delay (Rhee & Ishii, 2003). Finally, Kmenta and Ishii focus on
probability and cost as failure ranking strategies, with a strong focus on the
establishment of a failure chain of events and consideration of life-cycle cost
(Kmenta & Ishii, 2000).
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Military Applications of FMEA
Reliability Centered Maintenance (RCM) utilizes the FMEA process to
proactively manage assets or equipment and their associated risk mitigation
strategies. In the RCM method, failure modes are identified based on the function
and functional failure of the equipment or system under analysis. The method has
been widely adopted in the military community and is mandated by the U.S. Navy
for application on all major acquisitions or modifications. The military application
considers several factors within the analysis to include the probability of
occurrence, severity, possible preventive maintenance strategies and the cost of
performing maintenance versus a run-to-failure management strategy (NAVAIR,
2005). The reader is referred to the NAVAIR 00-25-403 standard for a discussion
and derivation of the various cost equations applicable to different failure
management strategies. The RCM process is provided in Figure 1.

Establishment of Ground Rules and Assumptions
and Project Plan
Partitioning of End Item into various levels of
hardware/software indenture down to the level of
intended analysis
Development of the Failure Mode Effects and
Criticality Analysis (FMECA)

Identification of significant functions in order to
determine potential adverse effects of function loss

Evaluation and Selection of Potential RCM tasks
(based on cost and safety)

Implementation and Field Feedback

Figure 1. RCM Process.

The RCM process utilizes a hazard/risk assessment matrix to visualize the derived
criticality of a potential failure mode. The matrix includes the severity and
frequency measures, plotted on color-coded X-Y axis. Detection is not considered.

Published by Scholarly Commons, 2018

9

International Journal of Aviation, Aeronautics, and Aerospace, Vol. 5 [2018], Iss. 1, Art. 2

The severity rating is typically selected based on domain expertise and any
previously observed failures. The frequency of occurrence is also considered based
on available data. The frequency is typically considered by considering both
potential and functional failures – which is typically obtained from field data. An
excellent discussion of the underlying theory (Potential-to-Functional Failure
Curves) can be found in several references to include (Moubrey, 1997; NAVAIR,
2005). The NAVAIR 00-25-403 standard provides an example of such a matrix
along with definitions of a four-point severity scale. An example adapted from the
standard is provided in Figure 2.
Frequency

Frequen
t
> 1 per
1,000
hours

Probabl
e
0.1 to 1
per
10,000
hours

Occasiona
l
0.1 to 1 per
100,000
hours

Remote
0.1 to 1
per
1,000,00
0 hours

Improbabl
e
< 1 in
1,000,000
hours

Severity

Catastrophic
(I)
Death/aircraf
tCritical
loss/damage
(II)
> $1 million
Major
injury,
primary
mission
Marginal loss,
major cost >
(III)
$100,000
Minor injury,
cost
Negligible >
$10,000
(IV)
Unscheduled
Figure maintenance,
2. Hazard Risk Index utilized in RCM process (NAVAIR, 2005)
damage
Subjectivity
below in FMEA
$10,000
The healthcare industry has also questioned both the reliability and validity
of FMEA. Reliability has been explored in several studies, with little research
performed on FMEA validity (Shebl, Franklin, Barber, Burnett, & Parand, 2011;
Ashley & Armitage, 2010; Shebl, Franklin, & Barber, 2009). Validity is essential
since, without it analysis techniques such as FMEA are prone to skepticism
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regarding their value, and it is difficult to provide feedback to improve the tool.
Furthermore, as stated by Kirwan (1996) techniques that depend on significant
amounts of judgment may not adequately and accurately quantify risk (Kirwan,
1996). Despite the concerns with the FMEA methodology, the approach has been
shown to improve quality and safety in the healthcare field (Battles, Dixon,
Borotkanics, Robin-Fastmen, & Kaplan, 2006).
Validity is defined as a measure to assess whether an instrument measure
what it was designed to measure (Bowling, 2002; Smith, 2002). Thus, in the context
of FMEA, validity aims to measure whether or not risks are proactively and
thoroughly identified, parameter estimates line up with observed data and identify
if the tool is indeed appropriate. Shebl et al. (2012) investigated FMEA validity
utilizing several measures. These included face validity, which refers to how
relevant experts view the tool. Context validity was defined as a measure of how
well the FMEA results in mirror information available in the application domain.
Criterion validity refers to the level of correlation of the FMEA outputs to other
measurement systems of the same variables. Moreover, finally, construct validity
was used to “determine the extent to which a particular measure relates to other
measures consistent with theoretically derived hypotheses concerning the concepts
that are being measured” (Shebl, Franklin, & Barber, 2012).
Their study, conducted during 2012, utilized two groups from a hospital
setting that were tasked to complete an FMEA on prescribing, administering and
monitoring of two prescription drugs (Shebl, Franklin, & Barber, 2012). Both
groups were familiar with the process and provided the same input information.
The researchers observed how these drugs were administered in a clinical setting
and mapped the subsequent process to a flowchart. This was then compared to the
mapped processes as determined by the FMEA teams to address face validity.
Although there were differences between the FMEA flowcharts and the observation
flowchart, the major steps in the process correlated well. Thus, the team concluded
that face validity appeared adequate for FMEA. Criterion validity was deemed low
by Shebl et al. due to several reasons. First, 59 percent of failures observed in
clinical data were identified by the FMEA team. Additionally, the probability of
failure and the actual observed frequency in the clinical data showed little
correlation. In general, the FMEA team appeared to estimate the probabilities
higher than actual observed data indicated. The team also scored failure modes
higher regarding severity than the data indicated (Shebl, Franklin, & Barber, 2012).
The research team concluded that FMEA should not be solely utilized to understand
and quantify risk in a healthcare setting.
Several research gaps remain in the literature. The impact of data quality
and quantity on the severity selection within FMEA/FMECA has not been studied

Published by Scholarly Commons, 2018

11

International Journal of Aviation, Aeronautics, and Aerospace, Vol. 5 [2018], Iss. 1, Art. 2

within the aerospace domain. Limited research has been conducted on rating
selection and probability estimation within the healthcare community. However,
much of research focused on identification/improvement of severity and occurrence
scales. The research findings are essential to identify factors that impact the severity
score, and thus substantially influence the overall risk reduction strategies both in
the new acquisition and fielded systems.
Method
As discussed in the literature review, numerous concerns with
FMEA/FMECA exist. However, FMEA/FMECA is most likely going to continue
to be used as an analysis and risk management tool as evidenced by recent
healthcare applications. Additionally, FMEA/FMECA is extensively utilized
within the military community as part of the RCM process. Thus, to reduce the
human subjectivity, it is vital first to quantify and demonstrate this uncertainty. The
researchers formulated a study to investigate human subjectivity, which is detailed
in this section. The study utilizes an in-between subjects design with three levels of
trial and two levels of experience. An in-between design was chosen since domain
expertise is often deemed as important and as a mitigating factor regarding
judgmental bias. Thus, a key focus of the study was to assess if any association
could be identified between experience level and severity selection. Each trial was
expected to take approximately 15 minutes and included a cool-down period of
several days before the next trial was conducted. The design was selected to ensure
that participants were not overburdened with analysis tasks and since the analysis
was not focused on the comparison of individuals. Rather, the objective of the study
was to determine if any association existed between experience levels and
information quantity on severity selection.
All study materials and protocols were reviewed and approved by an
Institutional Review Board (IRB). Informed consent was obtained from all
participants.
Participants
Participants were recruited from a large aerospace corporation and
consisted of engineers and analysts with varying degrees of education. All
participants that had experience (at least one year) performing FMEA/FMECA
analysis were accepted into the study. All participants were actively involved in
real-world RCM analyses utilizing FMEA/FMECA and well versed in failure mode
analysis at the time of the research.
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Sixty percent of the participants had 15 or more years of general work
experience, while fifty-three percent had greater than six years specifically
performing FMEAs. The participant pool included a significant number of former
military personnel (73 percent) with extensive experience troubleshooting,
repairing and analyzing military aircraft. Many of the participants had a college
education (93 percent). The participants had extensive experience with the systems
utilized within the study, thus were considered domain experts. Participants were
classified as experienced or inexperienced regarding FMEA/FMECA. For this
study, an experienced FMEA user was considered to have 10 or more years of
experience.
Materials
Participants were provided a worksheet to complete nine failure modes.
Materials were developed utilizing NAVAIR 00-25-403 guidelines (NAVAIR,
2005). The NAVAIR 00-25-403 standard was utilized since the participants were
very familiar with the standard and associated processes. Additionally, the
researchers did not want to introduce an unfamiliar scale or additional training
requirements and thus potentially impact the results. The severity scale was selected
within this study since it was assumed that frequency would be determined based
on numeric methods (as discussed in the NAVAIR 00-25-403) within an RCM
analysis. The standard utilizes a severity scale that consists of four levels (I through
IV). Category definitions were based on the levels as identified in MIL-STD-882E,
which included consideration of both failure cost and safety consequences
(Department of Defense, 2012).
Three systems were analyzed by the participants. The systems included an
aircraft flight control system (trial one), landing gear system (trial two) and a
hydraulic system (trial three). The three systems were selected since they could be
described in a general sense (without reference to a specific aircraft), were all
important aircraft systems and were well understood by all participants.
Participants were not provided any information during the first trial, except
a system description and the failure modes. The participants were provided
irrelevant failure and mishap data during the second trial, along with a system
description. Irrelevant data consisted of failure information that was not directly
tied to any failure mode under analysis. For example, during trial two the
participants were informed that the aircraft experienced ten mishaps related to the
landing gear during the past five years. Participants were informed that fifty percent
of these mishaps led to serious injury and thirty percent of the mishaps had
unknown causes. The remaining mishaps had been attributed the wheel and tire
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assemblies. Relevant data (thus data that could be connected to the failure modes
under analysis) was provided in trial 3. In contrast to trial two, participants were
informed that a significant proportion of mishaps had been attributed to hydraulic
pumps (which did have a corresponding failure mode). Failure data consisted of 80
data points for trial two and three respectively and included which component
failed, failure symptom(s) and flight hours at failure. Failure data was modeled on
typical data collected in field environments and provided in Figure 3 for reference.
All data was provided to several subject matter experts before the study for a
review, to ensure the information was representative of typical data available during
RCM analyses.
Discrepancy/Symptoms
ANTI SKID LIGHT CAME OUT UPON TOUCHDOWN FOR LANDING. SECURED ANTISKID SWITCH AND BRAKES WORKED WITHOUT ANTI-SKID.
STARBOARD MAIN LANDING GEAR WHEEL BRAKE ASSEMBLY WORN BEYOND
ALLOWABLE LIMITS.
PORT WHEEL BRAKE ASSEMBLY CEASED AFTER LANDING.
LEFT MAIN LANDING GEAR WAS SLOW TO INDICATE DOWN AND LOCKED.
APPROXIMATELY 20 SECONDS FROM TIME THE GEAR HANDLE WAS PLACED
DOWN TO GOOD 3 DOWN AND LOCKED. WHEELS WARNING LIGHT WAS
FLASHING WITH NEGATIVE AOA INDEXERS. AIRCRAFT WAS AT 150 KNOTS AND
600 F
PORT FORWARD LANDING GEAR DOOR LOWER HALF ATTACHMENT FITTING
BROKEN OFF.
PORT MAIN LANDING GEAR FOWARD DOOR OVERRIDE VALVE BAD.
RAISED LANDING GEAR HANDLE AFTER CAT SHOT AND ALL INDICATIONS
REMAINED DOWN AND LOCKED. TRANSITION LIGHT WAS ON AND AOA
INDEXERS WERE ON. AFTER APPROXIMATELY 5 MINUTES WE LOWERED THE
GEAR HANDLE AND ALL INDICATIONS WERE NORMAL FOR DOWN AND LOCKED.
NEVE
STARBOARD MAIN LANDING GEAR STRUT DOES NOT HOLD PRESSURE. NEEDS TO
BE REPLACED.
NOSE LANDING GEAR LINK OUT OF TOLERANCE.
NOSE LANDING GEAR LINK ASSY MESURES OUT OF LIMITS
ON INITIAL DIRTY UP, ALL THREE LANDING GEAR INDICATED UP. FLAPS
EXTENDED NORMALLY TO 30 DEGREES. GEAR TRANSITION LIGHT AND WHEELS
WARNING LIGHT WERE BOTH ON WITH NO AOA INDEXER LIGHTS.
TROUBLESHOOTING CHECKED GEAR/HOOK, AOA INDICATOR AND AOA HEATER
CI R

Component Replaced

Flight Hours

ANTISKID CONTROL BOX ASSEMBLY

2267

BRAKE ASSEMBLY

2839

BRAKE ASSEMBLY

3919

DASHPOT ASSY LH

1964

DOOR ASSY, MAIN GEAR FWD LOWER LH

1826

FWD DOOR CONTROL OVERRIDE VALVE

705

LDG GEAR CONTROL SELECTOR VALVE

2011

MLG STRUT ASSEMBLY LH

3254

NLG DRAG BRACE LINK ASSY
NLG DRAG BRACE LINK ASSY

1699
3503

PANEL ASSEMBLY,LAND

570

Figure 3. Typical Field Data utilized within FMEA/FMECA Studies

A sample system description is provided for reference: “The analysis
utilized a generic fighter jet horizontal stabilator system. The pilot utilizes a control
stick in the cockpit (with a hydraulic assist) to transmit inputs to the horizontal
stabilator actuator mechanically. The actuator receives inputs through mechanical
linkage and adjusts the horizontal stabilator appropriately utilizing hydraulic
power. The hydraulic actuator includes a cylinder which contains a piston. The
hydraulic actuator has several seals to prevent fluid leakage from the piston rod.
The stabilator is critical to maintaining control of the aircraft during all phases of
flight.” Failure modes for the flight control system included hydraulic actuator
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seals worn, cockpit control stick cracked beyond limits and cable from cockpit
control stick to actuator frayed. The additional failure modes in the study were
utility hydraulic pump shaft sheared, hydraulic reservoir seals are worn, hydraulic
thermal-bypass valve fails closed, main landing gear seals worn, strut hydraulic
service valve fails open and finally the nose landing gear strut assembly cracked.
Procedure and Data Analysis
The primary goal of data analysis was to determine how the proportion of
participants that selected a specific severity rating changed across failure modes
(organized by trials). Additionally, failure mode selection was also organized by
experience level to determine if an association could be established between
experience level and severity selection. Binary Logistic Regression was applied to
the data to identify any correlation between severity selection, trials and experience
level.
Each participant was required to complete nine failure modes across three
trials. Trials were randomly assigned to each participant. Each participant did
complete all trials. Although each participant completed trials in a random order,
the systems and associated failure modes remained unchanged across all trials. The
participants were tasked to select a severity rating ranging from I to IV for each
failure mode, given a different amount of input information. Different input data
sets were provided in each trial to ascertain if an association exists between severity
class selection and the amount of input information regarding the system. The
procedure is provided in Figure 4 for reference.
Next, the data was analyzed by comparing proportions between each trial
by the group. For example, the proportion of participants that selected a severity
classification for each failure mode during each trial was calculated by group (A
and B) and compared. Data were compared with all failure modes combined (thus
overall proportion of all participants by the group for a trial). Since the failure
mode severity data were categorical with a discrete outcome, a Fisher’s exact test
was utilized. Contingency tables utilized in this study are provided for reference
(tables 1 to 5).
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Figure 4. Study Procedure.

Table 1
Severity selection across all trials (counts n=117, all participants)
Irrelevant
Relevant
No Information
Information
Information
Provided (Trial 1)
Provided (Trial 2)
Provided (Trial 3)
I
20
15
10
II 9
6
9
Severity
Rating
III 5
12
11
IV 2
9
9
Table 2
Contingency table for trial 1 and 2 to test association between trial and severity
selection
Number of Participants that Selected Number of Participants that
Severity Class I
Selected Severity Class II-IV
Trial 1
20
16
Trial 2
15
27
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Table 3
Contingency table for trial 1 and 3 to test association between trial and severity
selection
Number of Participants that Selected Number of Participants that
Severity Class I
Selected Severity Class II-IV
Trial 1
20
16
Trial 3
10
29
Table 4
Contingency table for trial 2 and 3 to test association between trial and severity
selection
Number of Participants that Selected Number of Participants that
Severity Class I
Selected Severity Class II-IV
Trial 2
15
27
Trial 3
10
29
Table 5
Contingency table for to test association between experience level and severity
selection
Number of Participants Number of Participants
that Selected Severity that Selected Severity
Class I
Class II-IV
Experienced Users
12
15
Non-Experienced
33
57
Users
Results and Discussion
Binary logistic regression was performed to assess if any correlation could
be identified when considering severity selection versus FMEA/FMECA
experience level, general work experience as well as the three trials. To utilize
Binary Logistic Regression, the response (severity selection) was mapped to a high
and low level. Specifically, a severity selection of I or II was coded as HIGH, while
selections of III and IV were coded as low. These groupings were based on the
definition of the severity levels and were deemed logical. The model was deemed
statistically significant (p = 0.013). Thus an association between the severity
selection and the terms in the model was identified. Several Goodness-of-fit tests
(Deviance, Hosmer-Lemeshow) were also conducted to test the adequacy of the
model. The model passed all the tests conducted (Deviance p = 0.017, HosmerLemeshow p = 0.998). Additionally, the categorical predictor for trial was
significant (p = 0.003), thus it was concluded that the mean number of severity
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category selections across the trials were not equal. Odd ratios for categorical
predictors were also calculated. The odds ratio indicated how likely an event is to
occur with the level selected. Based on the odd ratios it was concluded that
participants were 4.53 times more likely to select a severity of I/II during trial one
when compared to other trials.
The first two hypotheses investigated in this study were related to both the
amount of input information (included/not included) and the type (mishap data,
failure data) available to the participants. It was hypothesized that inter-rater
reliability within the FMEA/FMECA process will decrease based on the amount of
input information (failure and mishap data) provided within the analysis. Thus, if
more information were provided there would be less consensus amongst
participants regarding severity rating selection. It was also hypothesized that the
type of information influences inter-rater reliability in varying degrees, and that
experienced users are less affected by the availability of superfluous information.
Inter-rater reliability was investigated by first analyzing severity rating selections
across the trials regardless of experience level. This study considered a severity
class I the most severe (death, asset loss) and a class IV the least severe (nuisance).
As illustrated in Figure 5, trial one had the most consensus (56 percent of
failure modes classified as severity class I), with the consensus apparently
decreasing in trials two and three. In trial two most failure modes were still
classified as severity class I (36 percent). However, in trial three there appeared to
be the least amount of consensus, with failure modes being evenly divided across
all severity classifications. Thus, not only did it appear that inter-rater reliability
does decrease as the amount of information is increased, but that the type of
information may influence selection in varying degrees.
Each case study was compared to the other case studies to determine if there
was any statistically significant association between the case study and how many
participants selected a severity class of I or severity class of II-IV, regardless of
experience level.
The null hypothesis was that there is there is no significant difference
between the proportion of participants that selected severity class I or II through IV
in case study 1 when compared trials two and three respectively. Utilizing a twotailed Fisher’s Exact yielded the following results:
• trials one versus two were not statistically significant (p = 0.1102),
• trials one versus three were statistically significant at a significance level of
0.05 (p = 0102), and
• trials two versus three were not statistically significant (p = 0.3479).
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Figure 5. Severity Selection across all trials (percentages, all participants).

Thus, there appeared to be no statistically significant difference between
severity class selection when no information (trial one) versus irrelevant
information (trial two) is provided. However, there did appear to a statistically
significant difference between the severity class selection when no information
(trial one) versus relevant information (trial three) is provided. There was no
statistically significant association when trials two and three were compared. The
inter-rater reliability was further analyzed by grouping the participant selections in
different configurations to ascertain whether participant demographics impacted
the results previously presented. The data were grouped in the following ways:
• participants with ≥ ten years of work experience,
• participants with ≥ ten years of FMEA experience, and
• participants with < 10 years FMEA and work experience.
Grouping the data in this manner yielded similar results, with an apparent
repeating trend that additional information (trials two and three) and the variability
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of severity class selections were associated. Specifically, regardless of how the
data was grouped, 50 percent or more participants selected the same severity class
in trial one (no information provided). This was contrasted to trials two and three,
where it was not typical for more than 50 percent of participants to select the same
severity class. The only exception was trial two for participants with ≥ ten years of
FMEA experience.
The apparent trend between decreasing consensus and the amount of
available information could have several reasons. Firstly, it was well known in the
cognitive psychology field that too much information can overwhelm our available
processing when complex tasks are performed. The nature and mechanisms of
information overload and cognitive biases have been explored by several authors
and likely related to limited biological hardware, noise within our memory channels
as well as natural selection biasing our development to utilize heuristics (Hilbert,
2012; Johnson, Blumstein, Fowler, & Haselton, 2013; Tversky & Kahneman,
1974). This may result in information cues being missed by some participants
resulting in less consensus. It is also important to consider how the information is
organized and presented. In this study, the information was presented in a raw
format to the analysis – since this is likely how they will perform the analysis in a
real-world setting. However, participants were not restricted and could have
organized the data into other formats if they desired. Interestingly it did not appear
that any of the participants reorganized the data. Future work should investigate the
role of how information is presented and organized within the FMEA/FMECA
process.
Cognitive biases such as anchoring or confirmation biases likely also play
a role in the risk assessment process (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). For example,
decision makers may bias their severity rating around a certain risk level (for
example severity rating of I). An additional bias that may also play a role in risk
analysis is the confirmation bias, where information is interpreted in such a way
that validates the analyst’s priori. These biases were investigated by grouping the
proportion of failure modes assigned to each severity level by trial. It is important
to remember that each participant completed trials in a random order. For example,
the first participant may have performed the trials in the order 1-2-3, while another
participant may have performed them in order 2-3-1 and so forth. As illustrated in
Figure 6, the proportion of failure modes assigned a severity of I in trial one
appeared higher, when compared to trials two and three. However, when trials two
and three were compared a similar proportion of failure modes was assigned to each
severity class. Siefer and Smith analyzed a large data set captured as part of a risk
management process over several years to identify if theoretical implications from
prospect theory (which includes cognitive biases) were present (Siefert & Smith,
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2011). The data set include consequence and likelihood of risks, and how they
evolved as the program matured. Siefer and Smith confirmed the presence of
cognitive biases and further indicated that subjective estimates (probability and
consequence) could be objective if historical data is utilized within the analysis
process. The research findings of this study suggest that this may not be the case
and that the quality of the data may not assess during the analysis process.

Figure 6. Severity classification by trial (regardless of experience level).

There appeared to be a clear distinction between trial one when compared
to trials two and three (supported by the statistical analysis presented earlier). In
trial one where no data was provided participants clearly aired on the side of caution
and thus attributing a larger portion of failure modes as high risk. However,
interestingly this pattern did not hold in trials two and three where the proportions
were approximately evenly distributed across all severity levels. In these trials, each
severity category was assigned approximately 25 percent of the failure modes.
Similar effects were observed by researchers such as (Fox & Clemen, 2005) who
investigated an ignorance prior. The ignorance prior is a cognitive phenomenon
where the assessor assigns probabilities based on the number of categories
available. They concluded and illustrated through five studies that it appears the
number of available categories sets the initial probability assessment. For example,
in the case of severity classification, a failure mode can fit into four categories.
Thus, an ignorance prior could be computed as 1/4 or 25 percent.
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In this study, it appeared that participants were not able to sift through the
provided information and identify the appropriate cues relating to failure relevance
to the failure mode under analysis. Thus, it appeared that larger amounts of
information might generally reduce conservatism. However, this is concerning
since even information not related to the failure mode will influence the decision
maker in a similar manner. The researchers further hypothesized that more
experienced users would more effectively vet through irrelevant information and
be less distracted by it – thus expecting to see higher consistency among
experienced users.
The null hypothesis was that there is there is no significant difference
between the proportion of participants that selected severity class I or II through IV
based on user experience. Based on a two-tailed Fisher’s Exact test there wasn’t a
statistically significant association between the experience level and the number of
severity class selection (p = 0.5038).
Thus, the null hypothesis was not rejected, and it was concluded that
experience level did not play a role in severity class selection within this study. This
result should be further investigated due to the small number of experienced users
that participated in this study (n = 4). This result may also be explained by
considering the background of most participants. Almost 70 percent of participants
came from an aviation background, thus equipped with a large amount of aerospace
domain knowledge. The failure modes in this study were all aerospace-related.

Conclusions, Recommendations and Future Work
This study highlighted through empirical evidence that risk assessment
participants are subjective during severity rating selection. Notably, it appears that
users who are provided with irrelevant failure and mishap data will tend to select
similar severity levels; however, when no information is provided to users, the data
collected demonstrates with statistical significance that user selections will be
dramatically more conservative. Additionally, participants appear to select similar
severity ratings regardless of the relevancy of the provided data.
Several recommendations are provided based on the study results. First, a
greater emphasis must be placed on the overall data quality at the onset of any RCM
(or FMEA/FMECA) analysis. Specifically, the relevance, fidelity, and accuracy of
the data must be established. Additionally, it is recommended that the analysis team
consider the severity rating independent of the input data (at least initially). This
will allow the team to consider the possible chain of events leading to a high-risk
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event without being potentially biased by input information. There may also be
value in assuming a high severity rating for each potential failure mode, followed
by the justification of reducing the rating. This will incorporate additional rigor
with the selection process and may reduce subjectivity. The team may also wish to
consider plotting different team member ratings on the Hazard Risk Matrix, along
with the consensus rating. This may allow additional important discussion and
refinement. Finally, although domain and process experience is important, experts
should always be questioned.
These findings are significant since they speak to the underlying validity of
this very commonly used risk management tool. They further illustrate that
significant focus must be placed on assessment of data quality since analysts appear
not to be able to distinguish data quality cues during severity selection.
Additionally, future work must be focused on understanding the impact of how
information is presented to the analyst during FMEA and extend these results to a
larger and more diverse participant base.
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